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even have occurred to him or his contemporaries? And, however much the "principle of self-consciousness" may be admitted, it can have no effect in improving or supplementing the appeal to facts, or experiences, or ideas which form part of a series,—being a necessary presupposition of any such fact, idea, or series.

Neither the strength nor the weakness of Mill's Utilitarianism seems to be sufficiently emphasized (and this is rather noticeably the case with reference to Bentham also), and no reference is made to the more recent elaboration of the doctrine in which Utilitarianism and Intuitionism are shown to be at one. In these points, and in what seems to me an attempt to read into Mill elements of an essentially modern view, I find the chief drawbacks to Dr. Douglas's exposition, as its chief merit is to be found in his sympathetic attitude towards Mill and generous recognition of all Mill's splendid intellectual and moral excellence as a thinker, and in the philosophical charm and value of his careful and instructive effort to exhibit each part of Mill's work in its connection with the rest of his life and thought.

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#### PSEUDO-PHILOSOPHY AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

By Hugh Mortimer Cecil. 1. *An Irrationalist Trio*—Kidd, Drummond, Balfour. London: The University Press, Limited, 16 John Street, Bedford Row, W. C., 1897. Pp. xvi., 308.

This book is written from a point of view violently anti-theistic, anti-theological, and above all anti-Christian, the author appearing to be an accepted champion of what Mr. Balfour would call "Naturalism," what he himself would call "Science" or "Rationalism." It purports to be an attempt to state and controvert the main contentions of "*Social Evolution*," "*The Ascent of Man*," and "*The Foundations of Belief*;" and since these three well-known books are occupied with some of the most difficult and disputed problems of life and thought, the attempt to evaluate them, familiar as they are, calls for a serious intellectual effort on the part of writer and reader.

It may be remarked that Mr. Kidd, Mr. Drummond, and Mr. Arthur Balfour are here treated as a "trio" only in the sense that the three essays in which their books are examined are brought together between the covers of a single volume; that they are all attacked by Mr. Hugh Mortimer Cecil and regarded by him as

“modern champions of theology” who have endeavored to “capture the scientific fortress by the use of pseudo-scientific methods;” and, further, that they all receive similar usage at Mr. Cecil’s hands, being quoted from at inordinate length and with frequent repetition, and treated with asperity, vituperation, and an unstinted imputation of stupidity, vulgarity, and dishonesty such as one had imagined to be out of fashion.

One ought perhaps to be always ready for the unexpected and the unexplained,—and the more, that it is not only in books, not only in “scientific” controversy, that we now and then see men in advanced stages of civilization hark back to modes of procedure fit only for their ancestors. Still, the unexplained everywhere calls for explanation; and it is not quite obvious why Mr. Cecil has written his book at this juncture; why he has written it in such a style, or who the public can be to whom he expects it to appeal. It must certainly be highly offensive to “Christians,” who after all still exist in considerable numbers, and form a not unimportant section of the respectable and intelligent portion of the community. It is hardly likely to be studied by Mr. Herbert Spencer, who is somewhat ineffectively patronized in the last chapter, and it cannot be very attractive to Mr. Karl Pearson, who is alternately blamed and praised, while Professor Huxley, the other great “Rationalist” who is selected for qualified distinction, is unfortunately no longer among possible readers. It is not likely to appeal largely to students of “Science,” who seem for the most part either to “despise and scoff” philosophy, or else to take orthodoxy under their “exiguous wing” (to quote Mr. Cecil); it is too “scientific” for philosophers, too stiff for the idle, too long for the busy, too pungent for a simple taste; and last, though not least, the books which it discusses have quite recently been widely read and most voluminously discussed. There is, however, no doubt that Mr. Cecil writes with considerable ability and genuine conviction, in a style which, while often trenchant not to say truculent, is generally clear and lively; also, that he has succeeded (though not, I think, with any striking originality) in pointing out many weak places in the views which he attacks. His book is from many points of view worth reading; his interest in philosophy is keen, and his logical acuteness great. But this does not lead him always to “define his terms” (a “counsel of perfection” which he frequently insists on), nor preserve him from occasional misstatements and contradictions; it does not prevent his being entangled

by ambiguities of language ; it does not help him always to perceive the precise confusion of thought to which the mistakes and incoherences which he notices are attributable ; it does not enable him invariably to appreciate the scope of the theories which he criticises.

For instance, Mr. Cecil's meaning would have been clearer, and it would have been easier to estimate his merits and weaknesses, if he had given us careful definitions of the sense in which he uses or accepts such terms as scepticism, rational, reason, sanction, irrationalism, evolution, good, right,\* not to mention scientific method, real world, things, matter, inference, experience, etc., terms which he uses constantly, and the meaning of which is very important for a right understanding of his view.

Again and again he speaks of Mr. Kidd's book as having been written with the object of persuading men, by a reasoned appeal, to act in a certain "irrational" manner, and so conduce to future progress ; and then he gibes at the writer for using reason to persuade men to unreason, and for being so absurd as to think that his feeble assistance will aid the "great deep-seated evolutionary forces" to fulfil their task. But if Mr. Cecil had observed the meanings attached by Mr. Kidd to *Reason*, part of this taunt (and much of what he says in other passages) would be seen to lose point. And the laugh at attempting to assist evolution has no special appropriateness as against Mr. Kidd, whose book aims rather at being historic, analytic, and predictive than hortative.

Then, again, what does Mr. Cecil mean by "good"? On p. 121 he says, "If God can prevent the suffering [of the world] and will not, he is not *good*," and p. 171 speaks of "crediting God only with the *good*" in Nature (*cf.* also pp. 52, 142, 144). And at p. 115, in speaking of the problem of evil, it is plain that by evil he means pain, and elsewhere that by *bad* he means voluntarily productive of pain (*cf.* p. 122, etc.). In these places we have admission of a "problem of evil" (for what more is that than the recognition that evil exists of which we do not see the justification?) and reference to a standard of goodness and badness ; while elsewhere he has said that to talk of a problem of evil is unmeaning, and has refused to allow such reference to a criterion, asserting that the "conception of progress as improvement

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\* He does indeed say (p. 42) that "evolution is constant change," but this is not the admissible or admitted sense of the word, and in other passages he gives and must give to it, a different and much fuller meaning.

is altogether unscientific," and telling us not to "confuse" things by introducing a Being to whom *infinite goodness* is attributed, since *good* and *evil* are wholly relative.

And Mr. Balfour's appeal to consequences as a ground for accepting or rejecting certain views (which is a recognition of the supremacy of *Right*, a recognition of *practical* reason as something to which ultimate appeal must be made) is severely criticised by Mr. Cecil; but (1) in judging persons and actions to be good or bad he has himself acknowledged a standard of practical reason. (2) He seems sometimes to identify Right and True (accepting both practical and speculative standards), for he says, p. 198, "either biology is right or it is wrong. If it is wrong [= false], we will give up our theory. If it is right [= true], what harm [= wrong] can there be in teaching men the truth?" And unless we can identify the Right and the True, it is not self-evident that to teach the Truth is always Right. (3) Even if he gives up a distinctive practical standard, and says that Truth is all-sufficient, or at least more important than Happiness, he has still not got rid of a Practical Standard; he must still admit Right and Ought as contrasted with Fact (though subordinate to it). For he is constantly allowing—or rather insisting—that many men both judge falsely and speak falsely, and holds strongly that it would be better if they judged and spoke truly; indeed, while most severe with those whom he holds to be mistaken or dishonest, he is very ready to attribute falsity and insincerity.

He says, for instance, speaking of Mr. Balfour, "It is not for the man against whom the insinuation of insincerity has been whispered by reviewer after reviewer to talk of the ethical virtues that flow from the acceptance of Christianity;" as though the whispers and insinuations of a reviewer need be proof of anything whatever in the person reviewed. Indeed, it seems difficult to understand how any one whose eyes were not clouded by prejudice could read the "Foundations of Belief" and fail to perceive the rare sincerity of the writer. But we have not now to learn—though we always have to regret—that no man and no book (especially if in the van of progress) can be secure from injustice, or that blind misunderstanding and misrepresentation are continually putting hindrances in the way of that evolution towards what is better, which, however, in spite of all obstacles, seems on the whole steady and irresistible.

Mr. Cecil is, it is true, unsparing wherever he detects a flaw or

error ; but this seems inconsistent, since he is sometimes inclined to give up the objectivity even of truth (which no doubt is a sacrifice demanded by the method that tries to base knowledge on "particulars"). Indeed, his position appears peculiarly unsatisfactory, being precisely that Naturalism against which Mr. Balfour has argued, in all its instability and inevitable incoherence. Mr. Cecil has not, as far as I can see, by any means estimated the force either of the special argument against Naturalism or of the whole contention as to the foundations of science of which it is a part, and, in fact, believes himself to be still impregnable in that hopelessly ruined "fortress."

And he derides the argument from needs, and by a question-begging use of epithets presents the ever-renewed struggle in thought and practice as a contest between "Science" and "Religion," as a crude opposition of two forces, of which the one is always rational, and the other irrational, hypocritical, prejudiced, and violent ; whereas, the truth is rather that the fight all along the line has been between different claimants to reason, different stages of Thought and Feeling,—a struggle that goes on also within the borders of Science itself, and within the very sanctuaries of Religion.

Mr. Kidd may have failed in his reading of "Evolution ;" Mr. Drummond's attempt to interfuse the selfish struggle for existence with love and self-sacrifice and to transform the apparent evil of the world to good may have broken down ; Mr. Balfour may have been less successful in championing orthodox Christianity than in exhibiting the necessary dependence of Science on Metaphysics ; but they have at least done much, and in a reverent spirit, to rouse men's minds to intelligent interest in the great questions which concern the relation of Fact to Philosophy, of what *is* to what *ought* to be, of Man to Nature and to God.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE MORAL SELF. By B. Bosánquet. London : Macmillan & Co. Pp. viii., 132.

It may be gathered from internal evidence that this little book was first produced in the form of University Extension Lectures, like the author's previous "Essentials of Logic ;" and it is no small distinction of that movement that, partly, perhaps, from the greater mental maturity of the audience than obtains in regular